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Although still accounting for a small segment of the global carbon market, the 
voluntary carbon market is a place for innovation where original solutions are 
proposed to deal with some challenges faced by the regulatory market, including 
efforts to value the occasional ancillary benefits of climate action, to simplify 
methodologies, or to guarantee the permanence of forestry assets. These innovations 
are reflected in the different standards used for voluntary offset projects and may 
provide some valuable lessons for on-going post-2012 negotiations. This study 
analyses two aspects of these standards: the type of projects they attract, and the 
transaction costs entailed by their procedures. 
Projects certified by “basic carbon standards” such as the VCS, the VER+ and the 
CCX are very similar to regular CDM projects, albeit for their size which can be 
smaller. Projects certified by “multiple benefits carbon standards” such as the GS and 
the CCB Standards however tend to be more diverse than CDM projects, both in 
terms of project location and technology. 
For large-scale projects, transaction costs can differ by up to 100% between 
standards, although they remain small compared to credit prices. For small-scale 
projects however, they can represent a real burden with costs around 2-3 €/tCO2e. The 
analysis of the internal rate of return (IRR) of hydro projects leads to a similar 
conclusion: as overall project costs dwarf certification costs, the choice of the 
standard has little influence on the IRR. However, for projects that require lower 
initial investments, such as biogas capture or manure management, the conclusion 
could be very different. 
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The euro/dollar conversion rate used in this study is 0.69 dollar per euro. 
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1. Introduction 
As consensus is growing on the necessity to mitigate future climate change by 
reducing current emissions, some companies, institutions, and individuals have taken 
steps to reduce their carbon footprint, even though they are not required to do so by 
regulation. This “voluntary” demand for carbon offsets, generated by projects that 
reduce emissions, is driving the “voluntary carbon market”. In their reference 
publication on the topic, Hamilton et al. (2008) distinguishes between the Over The 
Counter (OTC) market, which corresponds to the definition we just mentioned, and 
the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), a voluntary cap-and-trade system (see Box 1). 
Although the voluntary OTC market remains about 15 times smaller than the 
compliance offset market (CDM and JI), it has recently grown very rapidly. Hamilton 
et al. (2008) estimates that volumes transacted have grown almost five-fold since 
2005 reaching 41MtCO2e in 2007, while value grew almost seven-fold over the same 
period, to US$258million. 
This spectacular growth was not taken for granted in 2007: journalistic investigations 
and reports by NGOs unearthed projects of doubtful environmental integrity. 
Companies make up about 80% of total voluntary demand for carbon offsets. As one 
of their leading incentives is to communicate on their environmental responsibility, 
they are very sensitive to the risk of unfavorable press. The fact that their demand 
grew so much despite the concerns raised about offset quality hints that some 
progress has been made on that end to reassure buyers. The emergence of credible 
standards relying on robust methodologies and monitoring plans to guarantee 
emissions reductions, and sometimes other social and environmental benefits, has 
probably been instrumental in building the confidence of prospective buyers.  
Ecosystem Marketplace lists 13 offset project standards4 on the voluntary market, and 
referred to 2007 as “the year of the standard”. These standards can be classified in 
two categories, serving two types of needs. “Basic carbon standards”, such as the 
Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) or the Verified Emission Reductions plus (VER+), 
certify carbon accounting methods and guarantee that each credit they issue 
corresponds to an emission reduction of one ton of CO2e. “Multiple-benefit carbon 
standards”, such as the Gold Standard or the CCB Standards, also include broader 
environmental and social aspects. A carbon credit that has been awarded this type of 
standard includes an emission reduction of one ton of CO2e, but also the guarantee 
that the project generating this reduction provides additional benefits, to local 
communities or to ecosystems. “Basic carbon standards” are aimed at buyers focused 
on carbon accounting while multiple-benefit carbon standards” meet the demand of 
                                                          
4 The California Climate Action Registry’s Climate Action Reserve, CarbonFix Standard, Chicago 
Climate Exchange, Offsets Program , Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standards, 
Greenhouse Friendly, The Gold Standard, ISO 14064 Standards, Plan Vivo, Social Carbon , 
Voluntary Carbon Offset Standard , VER + Standard , the Voluntary Carbon Standard. The main 
features of those highlighted in green are detailed in Table 1; for more details on the others refer to 
Hamilton et al. (2008), p 48-51.  
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buyers who also need to “tell a beautiful story” (high contribution to sustainable 
development) about the offsets they use. 
Out of the 13 offset project standards existing on the voluntary carbon market, we 
chose to focus on only  five of them, not including the CDM which is also widely 
used to certify emissions reductions sold on the voluntary market, and which we use 
here as a benchmark for comparison. The five standards are the Voluntary Carbon 
Standard (VCS), the Gold Standard (GS VER – GS CDM)5, the VER+, the Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity (CCB) Standards and the Chicago Climate Exchange 
offset program (CCX).  They are the most commonly used standards on the voluntary 
market, totaling 56% of all voluntary certified projects in 2007 (Hamilton et al., 2008) 
and market participants often cite them as the most promising. Moreover, they 
provide an exhaustive coverage of standard types: three of them are basic carbon 
standards (VCS, VER+ and CCX), and the two others are multiple-benefit carbon 
standards (GS and CCB Standards). Four of them allow the certification of forestry 
projects6, i.e. the VCS, CCX, VER+ and CCB Standards, while the GS does not. The 
CCB Standards can only be applied to land-based carbon projects, including 
agriculture, forestry and other land-use, while the GS can only be applied to 
renewable energy and end-use energy efficiency projects. The most important 
features of these standards are displayed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Features of the standards studied 
Name Sponsors Launch date Project types Co-benefits OTC market share
Voluntary Carbon 
Standard 
(VCS)                   
The VCS Association is supported 
by various carbon market actors
March 2006: VCS V 1.0
Nov. 2007: VCS 2007
Release of new version 
imminent
Does not verify quantified carbon credits 
but validate that the pr ojec t design achieves 
cl imate, community and b iod iversity 
benefi ts. Must come on top of a carbon 
accounting standard to  generate genuine 
VERs.
All Basic carbon standard High: 27%
On the r ise 
Gold standard 
(GS VER, GS CDM)
The Gold Standard Foundation is 
supported by 60 NGOs and 
charitable organizations (including 
WWF)
2003: GS CDM V 1.0
2006: GS VER V 1.0
Sep.2008: GS V 2.0
Renewable energy, end-
use energy efficiency  
Multiple-benefits carbon standard Small: 9%




The VER+ is administrated by
 the german auditing company Tüv 
Süd
April 2007: VER+ V 1.0
May 2008 VER+ V 2.0






The C limate Community, 
and Biodiversity Alliance 
is supported by NGOs (incl. CI, 
TNC, CARE) and companies (BP, 
Intel, SC Johnson)
May 2005:                     
CCB Standards V 1.0
Dec. 2008:                     
CCB standards V 2.0
Land Use, Land Use 
Change and Forestry 
(LULUCF)
Multiple-benefits carbon standard. Very small: 2%
On the r ise
CCX Offsets Program
(CCX)
 The Chicago Climate
Exchange counts more than 350 
CCX members (capped emitting 
industries,market actors)
2003 Agricultural, coal mine 
and landfill methane, 
carbon soil, forestry, 
renewable energy, ozone 
depleting
Basic carbon standard Small: 7%
Declining
 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
                                                          
5 Both the Gold Standard and the CCB Standards can come on top of the CDM label, or certify 
purely voluntary projects. As the procedure is slightly different in these two cases, we chose to 
separate them and treat each case as an independent standard: GS VER, GS CDM, CCB Standards 
and CCB CDM. 
6 As opposed to the CDM compliance market, forestry projects have always been high in demand 
in the voluntary markets. They were the source of 37% of the credits sold on the OTC in 2006, and 
15% in 2007.  
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This study aims to analyze whether or not these different standards attract different 
types of projects and understand what are, from the project sponsor and developer 
point of view, the relative benefits of developing a project along a specific standard 
among those in existence in the voluntary market. In particular, we examine the 
financial implications (transaction costs and operating time) of this choice; this study 
may therefore also help identify lessons at a time of intense discussions and 
propositions about re-thinking and reforming the CDM as a helpful tool for the 
challenges lying ahead. 
2. The standards viewed from the projects they certify 
This section analyzes, for each of the above-listed standards, several characteristics of 
candidate or registered projects, including their size, their location, and the 
technology they use to reduce emissions. As most standards exist only since one or 
two years, we chose to include their “pipeline” in the analysis in order to increase 
sample size. The “pipeline” of a standard consists of projects that have applied for 
certification under a standard, but have not yet been certified. In this analysis we also 
include the CDM pipeline for comparison (UNEP RISØ as of July 2008); to make the 
CDM project portfolio comparable to those of young standards and thus capture any 
changes in CDM application trends, we only kept CDM projects that requested 
registration after January 1st, 2007. 
2.1.  Material and methods 
All standards must keep track of the projects they certify. Most often, they maintain a 
project database or a registry which are available online. The pipeline however is 
seldom listed. Moreover, some interesting characteristics are sometimes lacking. We 
therefore completed these databases with several other sources: 
o Information provided by the standards administrators,  
o Project Design Documents (PDDs) available online from the standards’ 
project databases, 
o PDDs displayed online by Designated Operational Entities’ (DOEs), 
o Project portfolios displayed online by several project developers. 
The information gathered from these different sources allowed us to compile a 
database of 415 offset projects, either certified by or in the pipeline of one of the five 
standards we selected for this study. Given the difficulty of accessing information and 
the heterogeneity of certification processes among standards, we do not guarantee that 
it constitutes an exhaustive list of their respective portfolios and pipelines. 
Nevertheless, for each standard we presented the projects sample to the standard’s 
administrator. After a check of the sample and the characteristics we drew from it, all 
administrators reckoned that it was representative of the projects they certify.  
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In this section, we also look at the demand side of standardisation. We tried to 
determine whether carbon credits are sold at a premium price if and when they are 
certified. This market analysis is based on existing data published on the subject by 
Hamilton 2008, WWF 2008, and New Carbon Finance 2008, completed with direct 
interviews of market participants (9 offset retailers, and 3 carbon asset managers). 
Box 1: What about CCX offsets? 
The CCX is a voluntary cap-and-trade system. Its “full members” are U.S-based 
emitting industries that have committed to reducing their GHG emissions. At the 
beginning of the year, they are allocated a number of Carbon Financial 
Instruments (1 CFI=100tCO2e) corresponding to their reductions commitments. 
Every year, they must surrender enough allowances to cover their emissions. 
Offset project developers (so-called “providers” or “aggregators”) can also get 
enrolled as “participant members” and provide the trading platform with CCX 
verified offsets. Once on the platform, these CCX project-based credits and the 
CCX allowances are commoditized into Carbon Financial Instruments (CFIs) that 
can be purchased by Members or Liquidity Providers for compliance or other 
purposes. 
Such offsets are more akin to CDM credits used for compliance than to voluntary 
offsets purchased as part of a voluntary decision to offset emissions, for example 
to offer “carbon neutral” products or services. The CCX global offset portfolio is, 
therefore, not comparable to the portfolio of other standards. However, some 
CCX participant members provide an offset retailing service to individuals and 
companies that are not members to the CCX and yet want to offset some or all of 
their emissions with CCX project-based credits. In that case, the CCX offset 
program is used as a standard for the voluntary OTC market. It is this use of CCX 
offsets that we intend to survey here. We therefore restricted our analysis of CCX 
projects to those intended to be sold on the OTC market. 
Dozens of organizations are registered as “offset providers” or “offset 
aggregators” in the CCX. We identified those who were selling offsets on the 
OTC market – that is to non-CCX members – by scanning their website. This was 
confirmed by interviewing these offset providers. This way, we were able to 
confirm that offsets directed to the OTC market came only from four offset 
retailers offering credits from a total of 18 CCX verified projects. In 2007, only 
0.5 MtCO2e/year of emissions reductions they generated were sold on the OTC, 
which is 13% of the estimate of Hamilton et al. (2008) for CCX credits transacted 
the same year. As CFIs are standardised contracts that incorporate a variety of 
products, the remaining 87% may therefore consist in CCX allowances, and not in 
project-based CFIs. 
2.2.  Pre-CDM credits: an ebbing wave? 
“Retro-active crediting” is no longer allowed for CDM projects registered after 
March 31st 2007. This means that only reductions occurring after project registration 
can be credited. While they are awaiting registration by the CDM Executive Board, 
some offset projects seek certification under a voluntary standard. Because they allow 
Mission Climat Working Paper • N° 2009 -4 
CDM methodologies, the VCS, VER+, and GS VER are interesting ways for these 
so-called “pre-CDM” projects to start generating carbon credits before their CDM 
registration date. In our database, we distinguish between strictly voluntary projects 
and pre-CDM projects if the latter present an official UNFCCC PDD and appear in 
the UNEP RISOE CDM pipeline. Figure 1 shows, for each relevant standard, the 
share of pre-CDM credits within their portfolios of projects generating credits in 2007 
and 2008. 
Figure 1: Share of pre-CDM credits within VER+, VCS and GS portfolios  









Credits generated in 2007





Credits generated in 2008























Credits generated in 2007
GS VERs 100%
Credits generated in 2008
17 projects, 976 KtCO2e13 projects, 659 KtCO2e
By way of example, our database consists of 13 VER+ projects generating credits in 2007 
(11 pre-CDMs and two VERs) while we have only four VER+ projects for 2008 (one pre-
CDM and three VERs). Consequently, among the 13 pre-CDMs crediting in 2007, 12 
passed UNFCCC registration over 2007 and the one left continued to generate pre-CDM 
credits in 2008 with the latter two strictly VERs and one new entrant to the pipeline. 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
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In 2007, pre-CDM credits produced under the VCS, VER+, and GS VER accounted 
for respectively 71%, 93% and 59% of their portfolios. In their 2008 pipeline, these 
shares drop to 60%, 2%, and 0%, as many projects have successfully registered over 
2007. Most pre-CDM projects certified under the VCS and VER+ became CDM 
projects, while those certified under the GS CDM all switched to generating GS 
CERs after passing UNFCCC registration over 2008. As the first commitment period 
of the Kyoto protocol begins, 2008 is also the first year when pre-JI projects have an 
opportunity to be registered, to generate JI credits, and thus be removed from the pre-
JI projects category. 
These figures show that in 2008 the supply of these standards started to diverge 
towards “strictly” voluntary projects. As the delays in the CDM registration process 
tend to grow, this sharp drop is rather counter-intuitive. This may however be 
explained as follow: 
Claiming pre-CDM credits is no longer allowed under the GS. Only projects that have 
been submitted for CDM validation prior to January 31st, 2008 can indeed apply for 
the GS VER and only if they can prove they have been facing unexpected delays in 
the CDM registration process. For projects coming on line later on, pre-CDM VERs 
cannot be verified along any standard if they wish to apply for the GS CDM. 
In the early stages of their existence, the VER+ and VCS may have seen pre-CDMs 
over-represented within their portfolios as project developers would tend to prioritise 
them since they used to command a higher price on the voluntary market (see section 
1.6) and are developed along the CDM standard and thus offer more information 
available for over-booked DOEs (see section 2.5). 
However, the full pipelines of the VCS and VER+ are not readily available, as 
projects are directly approved by auditors. For these two standards, projects can also 
claim credits retro-actively. Given the increasing bottlenecks along the UNFCCC 
registration process and subsequent delays incurred by many projects applying for 
CDM registration, this possibility of faster and/or retroactive crediting could be 
attractive to project developers. Therefore, other pre-CDM waves on the voluntary 
market cannot be ruled out. 
Moreover, with persisting uncertainties on the post-2012 front, some project 
developers are seeking a double certification CDM-Voluntary Standard as a risk 
mitigation strategy: should the CDM market loose momentum in the running up to 
2012, they could try selling their credits on the voluntary market. This may however 
oversupply the voluntary market causing significant effects on the price of VER 
credits. 
Due to the preponderance of pre-CDM projects in the full portfolios of the VCS, 
VER+, and, to a lesser extent, in that of the GS VER, it will thus be important to 
distinguish them from “strictly” voluntary projects in the rest of this section. This 
distinction leads to more limited sample sizes, especially for the VER+ whose 
number of projects in our database drops to 8. 
Mission Climat Working Paper • N° 2009 -4 
2.3.  Geographical distribution of projects: multiple-benefit carbon standards 
reach outside of the CDM traditional range 
Figure 2: Geographical distribution  
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103 projects  
 
Source : Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
                                                          
7 The samples sometimes include projects that are no more generating credits in 2008. This is the 
case of pre-CDM projects which were registered in 2007. 
10 
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The VCS and VER+ have a large share of Asian projects, accounting respectively for 
45% and 43% of their full project portfolios. On the contrary, projects in Africa are 
under-represented; to date, we have been able to track only 2 VER+ projects and no 
VCS project in Africa (both are pre-CDMs) and 3 in South America. For the VCS, 
our database only has one project registered in Africa.  
These results highlight the similarities that these two “basic carbon standards” have 
with the CDM in terms of project geographical distribution. This is probably due to 
their large share of pre-CDM projects. Indeed, when these are removed, mainly 
Turkish and/or U.S. projects remain in their portfolios. The specific Annex 1 – non-
Annex B status of Turkey means that even these projects, while not being officially 
pre-CDM, may be ultimately directed to the compliance market (see Box 2). Indeed, 
there are no projects in the Middle East outside of Turkey. This tends to show that the 
VCS and the VER+ are essentially pre-compliance standards and the relatively high 
representation of “voluntary” projects based in US, Europe and Turkey in the VCS 
pipeline suggests that the VCS, in addition to being used to value emissions 
reductions prior to CDM registration, is also used to anticipate future climate change 
legislation such as a federal Cap & Trade in the U.S.. 
Unlike the GS CDM/JI whose 100% CDM portfolio compares to that of the CDM, 
the GS VER has a significant share of African projects (14%), yet a share of South 
American projects smaller than the VCS and the VER+. Turkey is here again well 
represented with 42% of the GS VER projects. 
With 35% of CCB Standards projects in Africa and 40% in South America, AFOLU 
(Agriculture, Forestry, and Other Land-Uses) projects confirm their strong potential 
for development out of Asia, and especially in Africa. As many projects are currently 
seeking the double accreditation VCS+CCB Standards, the VCS portfolio may soon 
become more diversified, with more projects in Africa and South America. The Plan 
Vivo System8, another standard solely dedicated to forestry and land-use projects, 
confirms this trend with three operational projects in Mexico, Uganda and 
Mozambique and two others under development in Rwanda and Malawi. 
The presence of pre-JIs diversifies several portfolios towards Europe and Russia, and 
the GS VER has 2 of them in New Zealand. 
Multiple-benefit carbon standards (GS VER and CCB Standards) thus attract projects 
outside of the CDM traditional range. In that respect, they can be seen as 
complementary to the CDM. 
Although the CCX allows the enrolment of projects out of the U.S. ground, 78% of 
the CCX projects whose credits are for sale on the OTC are U.S domestic projects. 
The remaining 22% are two Asian and two German projects. Since the CCX no 
longer enrols projects in EU ETS countries because of double-counting issues, this 
confirms that some old-vintage credits (before 2005) are still for sale on the OTC.  
8 www.planvivo.org  
Mission Climat Working Paper • N° 2009 -4 
We can finally note that Australia is almost absent in our database, as the CCB 
Standards is the only standard to have Australian projects (two) in its pipeline. This 
may be due to the dominating position of the “Greenhouse Friendly” standard 
managed by the Australian government. This “process standard” certifies both the 
quality of offset projects and the way companies measure the emissions they want to 
offset. The use of New South Wales Greenhouse Abatement Certificates9 (NGACs) 
to voluntarily offset GHG emissions has also lately gained increasing interest from 
individuals and companies in Australia. 
 
Box 2: The Turkish niche 
Turkey officially became the 189th Party to the UNFCCC in 2004; as an advanced 
developing country with lower GHG emissions per capita compared to other OECD and 
Annex-I countries, it was granted recognition of “its position that is different than other 
Annex I Parties”. By that time, the Kyoto protocol had been adopted by the other Parties 
to the UNFCCC (1997), leaving Turkey out of the Annex B. Turkey thus has a unique 
status of “Annex I non Annex B” country, keeping it from hosting either CDM or JI 
projects. In such a context, Turkey rapidly became a niche for the voluntary market. 
We were able to track 64 Turkish projects, all to be operational by 2010. 34 of them are 
wind projects, 22 hydro, two geothermal and two landfill gas. This highlights Turkey’s 
strong potential for renewable energy sources. As a matter of fact, the GS VER is 
predominantly used in this market with 45 
projects. Our database also lists 6 VER+ 
projects and twelve VCS, the 5 remaining are 
hydro projects that have not applied any 
standard. We only have emission reductions 
information for 54 projects. Should these 54 
certified projects deliver as expected, they 
would generate 5.1 MtCO2e/year by 2010, and 
a total of 19.7 MtCO2eby 2012. Taking 
account of the 64 projects, we can estimate the 
latter figure to reach 22.6 MtCO2e. 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
Arikran et al. (2008) sees Turkey’s preponderant role in the voluntary market as a strong 
commitment to accessing post-2012 global carbon markets. The talks between the 
Turkish Government and Parliament led the country to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 
February 2009. It now remains to be seen to what extent these “early” projects may 












                                                          
9 NGACs are energy efficiency certificates traded by large electricity suppliers and users under the 
New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme implemented in 2003. Participants must 
meet mandatory emission reductions target by purchasing and surrendering NGACs created from 
activities that reduce electricity consumption. 
12 
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2.4. Project technology: towards more visible co-benefits and innovation 
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103 projects
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
                                                          
10 The samples sometimes include projects that are no longer generating credits in 2008. This is the 
case of pre-CDM projects which were registered in 2007. 
13 
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Besides the preponderance of wind projects (55%), the GS VER also has significant 
shares of energy efficiency (10%), hydro projects (16%) and a wide variety of other 
project types. Despite having a scope of project types narrower than the other 
standards, the GS demonstrates a great capacity to attract innovative technologies 
such as biodiesel for transport from waste cooking oil recycling11, solar steam, 
photovoltaic, efficient cook stoves and geothermal energy. 
The CCB Standards distinguishes 6 types of forestry projects, with several projects 
using a combination of technologies. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) is the most common component, used in 32% of CCB 
Standards projects. According to the standard’s administrator, this dominance was 
triggered by the Bali COP/MOP in December 2007. Mounting interest in the possible 
role of REDD in a future climate regime seems to have dramatically stimulated the 
number of REDD applicants. As the feasibility of a direct link between REDD and 
compliance markets, in the form of tradable REDD credits, is being debated, the 
experience gathered by these standardised REDD projects developed on the voluntary 
market will provide highly valuable material to negotiators. 
To date, no forestry project has yet been certified under the VCS AFOLU since 
AFOLU was only integrated into the VCS from the release of the VCS AFOLU 
Guidelines  in late 2008. According to some market participants and standard 
administrators however, a significant number of projects are currently awaiting the 
standards to endorse methodologies so to seek the double certification CCB 
Standards-VCS AFOLU. This double certification is aimed to combine the rigorous 
carbon accounting and permanence rules of the VCS to the broader social and 
environmental dimension of the CCB Standards. Should this preliminary finding be 
confirmed by the upcoming VCS projects, it would be a genuine difference with the 
CDM which has so far been largely unable to attract forestry projects. 
The CCX pattern is interesting: 65% of projects come from either agricultural soil 
carbon enhancements or from the forestry sector, two technologies largely ignored12 
by the CDM and the VER+, and not covered by the Gold Standard. Unlike methane 
or other gas capture projects where direct measurement is required by the CCX, 
agricultural soil sequestration projects can generate CCX offset credits for the 
verified use of technologies or practices that are known to reduce emissions at rates 
that are scientifically proven and discounted for conservativeness. These projects also 
account for a large part of the CCX global offsets portfolio, with respectively 35% 
and 12% of the offsets and early action credits issued as of 09/07/200813. This may 
therefore show the positive effect of the use of practice and performance-based 
methodologies on the development of agricultural soil sequestration projects (see 
section 2.3). 
11 To date, no methodology for biodiesel from dedicated crops has been developed. 
12 Debates over the additionality and sustainability of these projects are still on-going. 
13 See the CCX Registry Offsets Report: http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/offsets/projectReport.jsf
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2.5. Projects size: related to transaction costs? 


































(number of projects in the sample)  
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
In terms of project size, the CCB Standards clearly stands out with an average project 
size of 334 ktCO2e/year. This large average is due to a few projects with a large 
REDD component. Some of them are forecasting emission reductions up to 
3.4 MtCO2e/year. The median size, around 50 ktCO2e/year is more comparable to 
other standards. 
The CCX seems to attract more small-scaled projects with a median project size of 
only 20 kt CO2e/year, less than half the figure for CDM projects. The figure was 30kt 
CO2e/year for the VCS. If one focuses on small-scale projects (defined here as 
projects that generate less than 60 ktCO2e/yr)14, CCX and VCS “strictly” projects are 
still smaller than CDM projects, though the difference is narrower. The median size 
of the first two gets down to 20 and 15 ktCO2e/year respectively, while the median 
size of CDM small-scale projects is 26 ktCO2e/yr. Again, a possible explanation for 
the CCX could be the difference in requirements that make some farm-scale projects 
profitable, a possibility totally unthinkable for CDM projects (see section 2). The 
VCS allows the development of performance-based methodologies to demonstrate 
additionality: the projects beating a given performance baseline, are considered to be 
additional. This could also greatly lower the critical size to ensure project 
profitability. However, no such methodology has so far been approved by the VCS 
board. The current figures are thus more likely explained by lower transaction costs. 
                                                          
14 The CDM definition of small scale, though often approximated to the less than 60 ktCO2e/year 
definition, is more complicated: renewable energy projects with a maximum output capacity of 15 
megawatts, energy efficiency improvement projects reducing energy consumption by up to the 
equivalent of 60 gigawatt hours per year, and other project types emitting less than 60 ktCO2e/year 
(decision 17/CP.7., paragraph 6(c), amended by 1/CMP.2, paragraph 28.) or less than 16 
ktCO2e/year for forestry projects.  
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They could also simply be an artefact due to small sample sizes. The “strictly” VER+ 
projects have a higher average size (61 ktCO2e/year), very similar to that of the CDM.  
Although the GS CDM and GS VER attract projects of various sizes, the average size 
of their projects is driven up by the predominance of large wind projects within its 
portfolio. This pattern in a “multiple-benefit carbon standard” is consistent with the 
findings of Dechezleprêtre et al. (2007) which show that large projects and those 
involving wind power are more likely to deliver co-benefits from technology transfer 
(knowledge and equipment). 
2.6. The puzzling market for standards 
Two studies15 provide some insights on credit prices for the different standards on the 
OTC. As there have only been few tenders for voluntary carbon credits on market 
exchanges so far, both studies rely on interviews of market participants. As shown in 
Figure 5, they obtained very different results with wide price ranges. This is in part 
due to small sample sizes: for the standards we consider here, the estimates of 
Hamilton et al. (2008) are based on 21 data-points16 and those of Kollmuss et al. 
(2008) rely on a single carbon trading and project facilitation business. Nevertheless, 
both studies show no conclusive price differentiation across standard in 2007. Though 
an update of the State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets (Hamilton’s study) indicates 
clearer price separation across standards by mid-2008, many other show the price 
other project characteristics, such as size, type and location are probably also 
important in determining the credit price that a given project can command. 
Moreover, the lack of transparency and access to information on prices as well as 
market fragmentation contributes to the heterogeneity of credit prices (Bellassen and 
Leguet, 2007).  



























Sources: Hamilton 2008, Kolmuss 2008, Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
                                                          
15 Hamilton et al. (2008) and Kollmuss et al. (2008). 
16 Seven for the GS, six VCS, one VER+, seven CCX, and zero CCB Standards. Each data-point 
corresponds to a survey response of one retailer indicating that more than 90% of its volume was 
verified by one particular standard. 
17 Prices for verified credits (not forward transactions). 
16 
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We tried to refine explanations to the absence of price standardization through direct 
interviews with a dozen of worldwide voluntary carbon market players (9 offset 
retailers, 3 carbon asset managers). From these, we gathered two important elements 
on voluntary carbon credit prices. 
The first key element pertains to the “maturity” of the OTC market, which varies 
considerably among countries. According to most market participants interviewed, 
the UK demonstrates the furthest “maturity”, meaning that customers have become 
more familiar with the voluntary carbon market and are now demanding that the 
credits they buy be certified. It now seems almost impossible to sell offsets that are 
not certified by one of the existing third party standards. Certification has therefore 
become indispensable for accessing the market. Offset retailers often participate in 
the choice of the standard, although the decision is ultimately made by the project 
developer. In most other European countries, offset buyers are less demanding, 
although recognition for standards is gaining ground. The Netherlands and the 
Scandinavian countries are regarded by professionals as places where this 
phenomenon is quickly occurring. Conversely, some of the market players 
interviewed reckon that the French, and to a lesser extent the German customers pay 
little attention to third party certification and concentrate on investing in charismatic 
projects rather than in dematerialised credits.  In the US, the CCX has long been the 
only standard available for domestic projects which was the most appealing one to 
American customers (Bellassen and Leguet, 2007). However, this has changed over 
2008: market participants increasingly show interest in projects abroad providing 
visible development benefits, and for domestic projects, other standards, such as the 
VCS and the CCAR18 (California Climate Action Registry) are gaining ground as 
pre-compliance buyers bet on their validity in a future U.S. federal Cap & Trade. 
One key element to understanding the absence of price standardization in the OTC 
therefore lies in the different levels of market “maturity” from country-to-country. If 
most retailers declare that the global context pushes them to seek certification for 
their projects, the recognition standards get from buyers is nonetheless very variable 
among countries. This geographical differentiation (level of education) combined to 
the buyer segmentation (different types of buyers for different types of needs: flight 
offsetting for individuals, Corporate Social Responsibility or pre-compliance 
strategies for businesses) therefore affects the price premium that can be commanded 
by certification. 
The second key element that does not appear in recent relevant studies is that despite 
the price heterogeneity, multiple-benefit standards manage to command price 
premiums. Co-benefits and the associated “luxury” mark are a likely explanation for 
this. Another much cited reason is the shortage in credit supply: to date, the CCB 
Standards has only certified 7 projects, and the Gold provides the market with very 
small supply (to date, there are 31 registered GS projects delivering 
18 US projects meeting CCAR standards have been recognized by the VCS Association, and can 
generate VCUs. 
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2.5 MtCO2e/year). Most of the professionals we interviewed said that a Gold 
Standard credit is commonly worth 50% to 100% more than its CDM or voluntary 
equivalent (VCS or VER+) because the limited availability of these credits contrasts 
with a strong corporate demand. However, increasing supply of GS credits is 
expected and may impact prices significantly. As of April 2009, there were 159 
projects publicly posted in the GS Registry as awaiting registration (listed or 
validated status) with 15 million high-quality CERs/VERs to deliver each year. In this 
context, the large supply of pre-CDM credits may soon struggle to find buyers. 
3. Third party standards and transaction costs 
Having a project certified by a third-party standard means respecting a certain number 
of criteria and proving this compliance through an external audit. Each criterion 
implies either additional fees or work at several steps of the project cycle. This 
section aims to provide a quantitative evaluation of these transaction costs, using an 
assessment tool designed for this purpose (see matrixes in appendix 1 and 2). It 
concludes by looking at the time necessary to certify a project along the different 
standards according to their respective requirements. 
3.1.  Material and methods 
This tool draws up the list of the standards’ features along the project cycle, and links 
them to the subsequent costs incurred by the project developer. 
In this section, we distinguish two types of costs: 
o Direct fees, whose levels are fixed and established by the standards’ 
administrations or registries. Such fees can be demanded for project registration, 
credit issuance, and account opening or transactions. 
o Structural costs occurring along the certification process, which are relative to 
the standards’ respective requirements and special provisions. In order to assess them 
and obtain reliable figures, we conducted direct interviews with a number of project 
participants, i.e. Designated Operational Entities (DOEs, independent auditors 
accredited by the CDM Executive Board), consultants, and offset project developers, 
with notable experience in project implementation and certification. These 
quantitative estimates are expressed in “man-day”, i.e. the work one person can 
produce in a day, which is a unit they commonly use to evaluate and charge services. 
The price of a man-day was set at 1,000€/man-day in our estimates of these structural 
costs, as it is representative of the price that can be charged by a consulting or an 
auditing firm. One must bear in mind however that this price is subject to variations 
depending on the pricing policy, experience and expertise of the firm. In the current 
context of DOE shortage, several interviewees reported a recent increase of auditing 
fees above 1,000 €/man-day. On the other hand, some of the structural costs (such as 
writing the Project Design Document) need not necessarily be externalised. When the 
project developer possesses the skills to have this work done by its own employees, 
the price of a man-day can be much lower than 1000€. 
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This methodology was deemed relevant by most of the professionals interviewed, 
some of them having developed a similar approach in their own project feasibility 
studies. 
Nevertheless, they highlighted several limitations that must be taken into account: 
o Forestry and non-forestry projects cannot be compared on a same basis. There 
is moreover very little experience on forestry projects other than Reforestation and 
Afforestation. We therefore distinguish non-forestry and forestry offset projects, with 
a second matrix only focusing on Afforestation and Reforestation projects. However, 
as project development methodologies and guidelines now tend to be streamlined, 
our results may also be applicable for other project types within the LULUCF such as 
REDD. 
o Experience shows that transaction costs are technology and scale dependant. 
While it makes sense to estimate the average difference in transaction costs between 
standards, the absolute results are not very meaningful. Our matrixes therefore take 
the CDM project as a benchmark and set values by default for a typical project. 
Drawing on these fixed figures, the professionals were able to provide relative 
estimates for the voluntary standards.  
o Auditing costs or those charged by the standards and their registries, are 
different from those relative to project development and general management as they 
may not be out-sourced and remain internal. Some project developers indeed benefit 
from in-house expertise, work with NGOs familiar to the project area, or hire 
graduate students for the data collection which give rise to substantial savings.  
3.2.  Offset project cycle: the CDM benchmark 
To date, the literature available on offset project transaction costs only looks at the 
CDM scheme (UNEP 2007, Ellis & Kamel 2007, Michelowa 2003, Ahonen & 
Hämekoski 2005, Chadwick 2006, Neeff et al. 2007). Table 2 provides a comparison 
of our results for CDM projects with the empirical estimates of UNEP 2007, the most 
comprehensive and most widely quoted study on the subject. 
Our paper goes further in that it intends to estimate the internal or assistance costs 
along the project cycle due to the management of the project certification process. 
However, unlike UNEP 2007, we estimate neither the costs related to the initial 
project search and assessment, nor those related to the development of a new 
methodology. Initial project search and assessment was assumed to vary little 
between standards, and developing a new methodology remains a rare phenomenon in 
the voluntary market19. 
19  Two  methodologies  have  been  specifically  developed  for  the  GS  VER:  improved  cook‐stoves  and  small‐scale 
biodigesters.  No  specific  VCS  methodology  has  been  yet  accepted  by  the  VCS  Board.  As  for  LULUCF,  the  first 
methodologies are currently being developed for REDD projects under the VCS AFOLU guidelines, and the American 
Carbon Registry (Winrock Int.) released a Forest Carbon Project Standard in March 2009. 
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Table 2: CDM project transaction costs: our estimates vs. UNEP 2007 
This study2 UNEP 20073 This study2 UNEP 20073
Project search and 




Auditing (DOE) 6 000 2 000
Consultancy/internal 14 000 4 000
Standard (UNFCCC) 685 0
PDD development
Consultancy/internal 40 000 10 280-68 535 30 000 6 854-17 134
Validation
Auditing (DOE) 13 000 5 483-20 561 9 000 4 455-6 854
Consultancy/internal 5 000 not estimated 5 000 not estimated
Registration/Advance on first 
credit issuance
Consultancy/internal 13 000 not estimated 13 000 not estimated
Standard (UNFCCC)
First verification and 
monitoring
Auditing (DOE) 8 000 3 427-20 561 6 000 3 427-10 280
Consultancy/internal 5 000 not estimated 5 000 not estimated
Periodic verification and 
monitoring
Auditing (DOE) 6 000 3 427-17 134 5 000 3 426-6 853





1 Calculated on the base of €1000/man-day
2 Excuding LULUCF
3 UNEP (2007) Guidebook to Financing CDM projects
Costs1 (CDM small-scale, €)Costs1 (CDM large-scale, €)
2% of CER 
No fee if < 15kt, same as large-scale 
otherwise




















0,068/CER for the 1st 15kt and 0,137/CER 
for the rest     
0,068/CER for the first 15kt and 0,137/CER 
for the rest     
2% of CER 
PROJECT STAGES
 
This table compares the results of the current study to those of UNEP 2007. We separate 
three types of costs, depending on who the proceeds go to: consultancy/internal costs 
which can be either internalized or paid to an external consultant, auditing costs which 
go to the auditor, standard costs (the fees paid to the standard) and registry costs (the 
fees paid to the standards’ registry holder) 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
Globally, our results are consistent with the costs estimated by UNEP 2007. Our 
estimates for small-scale projects are, however, higher than UNEP 2007, especially at 
the stages of PDD development and project validation. This could be due to the very 
recent project development costs increases that mentioned some of the market players 
we interviewed. This trend is mainly attributed to the DOEs whose work entails 
higher costs for the project developer. This is caused by the reinforced severity of the 
CDM EB (more time spent on the project) as well as higher honoraries (DOE 
shortage). 
3.3.  Transaction costs for certification: light on the differences 
Reducing the transaction costs relative to the CDM has been the objective of several 
voluntary standards. The two matrixes in appendix 1 and 2 describe the standards’ 
features for non-forestry and forestry projects respectively, and assess to what extent 
they may impact costs along the project lifecycle. Tables 3 and 4 aggregate these 
20 
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quantitative results, and highlight cost differences relative to the CDM (∆). The 
apparent precision must not be taken for granted and be rather regarded as estimates 
that roughly quantify these cost differences along the project cycle. 
This assessment only looks at the project origination side and does not take account 
of expected carbon revenue that can vary from standard-to-standard. Premium credit 
prices can indeed make up for greater up-front costs.  
Table 3: Comparison of transaction costs for VER and CDM non-forestry projects  
Comparison of VER and CDM projects transaction costs1
TRANSACTION COSTS2 CDM (€) CDM SSC (€) cost1 (€) ∆ (%) cost1 (€) ∆ (%) cost1 (€) ∆ (%) cost1 (€) ∆ (%) cost1 (€) ∆ (%) cost1 (€) ∆ (%) cost1 (€) ∆ (%)
Auditing (DOE) 21 000 15 000 27 000 29 27 000 29 23 000 10 0 -100 18 000 -14 19 000 -10 13 000 -38
Consultancy/internal 63 000 53 000 81 000 29 66 000 5 66 000 5 64 000 2 45 000 -29 50 000 -21 15 000 -76







No fee if < 


















N/A Regist.: 0,04/VCU N/A X X X X
Auditing (DOE) 6 000 5 000 9 000 50 8 000 33 8 000 33 0 -100 6 000 0 6 000 0 6 000 0
Consultancy/internal 5 000 5 000 5 000 0 5 000 0 5 000 0 5 000 0 5 000 0 5 000 0 5 000 0
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1 Calculated on the basis of €1000/man-day 3 See appendix for quantitative details Cost increase
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Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
3.3.1. No host country’s approval required 
Unlike the CDM, voluntary standards do not require the approval of the host’s 
country’s Designated National Authority (DNA) to implement an offset project20. 
                                                          
20 The DNA approves hosted CDM projects and sets guidelines for project implementation. The 
approval of CDM projects is made official in a Letter of Approvals confirming the project’s 
contribution to sustainable development in the host country. 
21 
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Project developers interviewed say this process requires 7 to 8 man-days at the stage 
of PDD development, though according to some others it is sometimes even more as 
DNAs now get increasingly involved in the process. In some cases, DNA 
involvement may also decrease transaction costs through helpful guidelines and 
framework. This seems to be the case for small-scale hydro projects in China and 
small-scale wind projects in India (Elabed & Leguet 2008). 
3.3.2. Same auditor for validation and verification 
Another simplification common to the schemes of a number of standards, i.e. CDM 
SSC, small GS VER, VCS, and VER+, is to allow a project to hire the same auditor 
for conducting both validation and verification. We estimate this leads to about 25% 
reduction of the auditing costs (2 man days) for the 1st verification as the auditor is 
already familiar with the project and does not need as much time to understand its 
details. Besides lowering transaction costs, some auditors reckon this provision is 
important in the case of the VCS, and VER+, as these two standards rely solely on 
auditors to approve projects: a project validated by the auditors is automatically 
approved, whereas in the case of the CDM, the Executive Board checks the work of 
auditors (DOEs). In the absence of this check, some auditors are reluctant to verify a 
project whose validation has been conducted by another auditor, as they have no 
control on the quality of the work that has been done at the validation stage. 
3.3.3. An Environmental Impact Assessment is not required but is almost 
always undertaken  
An environmental impact assessment (EIA) identifies and evaluates the 
environmental impacts (other than carbon) of a project, and proposes mitigation 
measures when relevant. We estimate that this entails about 5 man-days in terms of 
resources. The GS VER Micro, VCS, CCX, and VER+ only require an EIA to be 
conducted if prescribed by the relevant local or national law. However, given that 
many countries have now developed EIA regulations and the large number of pre-
CDM projects in the voluntary market, EIA are almost systematically undertaken.   
3.3.4. Micro GS projects benefit from special validation and verification funds 
Some measures specific to certain standards can also yield cost savings. The GS 
exempts eligible micro-scaled projects (< 5 ktCO2e/year) from validation and 
verification. Instead, these projects contribute to two dedicated funds, the validation 
and verification funds, which are used by the GS Foundation to pay for random 
validation and verification of the micro-scaled projects it has certified.  
3.3.5. Practice-based and performance based methodologies for the CCX and 
VCS 
For project developers using a standardized methodology of the CCX, the CCX does 
not require a validation stage in advance of verification (called “project verification 
and enrolment”). This is because the CCX performs the validation in developing the 
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methodology and project developers must then abide by it. We estimate this reduces 
auditing up-front costs by about 40% compared to the CDM scheme. Furthermore, 
baseline determination, additionality demonstration, and monitoring are often 
simplified in CCX methodologies: these methodologies define an uncommon practice 
(e.g. no-till farming), and determine the average reductions achieved when the 
practice is implemented. The only monitoring consists in checking that the practice 
has been indeed put in place. We estimate this kind of benchmarking allows further 
reduction in up-front costs of about 50% for the PDD developed for the CCX, when 
compared to those developed for the CDM. The VCS allows performance-based 
methodologies, that is methodologies which consider all reductions under a sectoral 
performance benchmark to be additional. These could lead to costs savings similar to 
CCX methodologies. To date, however, no such methodology has been approved by 
the VCS board. 
3.3.6. Ensuring co-benefits for the GS 
As a multiple-benefit carbon standard, the GS has implemented special provisions to 
go further than the CDM in ensuring the sustainable development component of 
offset projects. These include the GS Sustainable Development Matrix and 
monitoring plan, as well as tougher requirements on the organisation and reporting of 
the local stakeholder consultation. Compared to the CDM, these provisions of the GS 
VER entail more work along the project lifecycle with associated cost increases of 
about 20% for PDD development, 30% for auditing at validation and first 
verification, and 33% for following verifications,. 
The new GS version (GSV2)21 includes rule changes but mainly intends to give 
project participants further guidance along the certification process. However, some 
project developers believe that the GSV2 could increase the certification costs up to a 
10% as it appears more stringent on reporting.  
The fees charged by standards administrators and registries for project registration, 
credit issuance or account opening also vary from standard to standard22. Tables 4 
and 5 summarize this information and compare the transaction costs associated with 
the different standards. In order to account for the costs that depend on project size 
and verification schedule, we take two examples. Table 4 presents the transaction 
costs for a “typical voluntary project”: emissions reductions of 50 ktCO2e/year, 
verified every year during the first seven years. Table 5 is based on a smaller project 
with emissions reductions of 5 ktCO2e/year, verified every two years over seven 
years. 
21 GSV2, applicable from August 2008 
22 The VCS association appointed 4 organizations to run its registries. As they are not yet 
operational, their pricing policies are still unavailable. However, the VCS wishes account fees to 
be affordable for small project developers. Market players therefore anticipate the registries to set 
their fee proportionally to the number of credits registered rather than to charge a fixed account 
fee. In our calculations, we assume a charge of €0.10/VCU for project registration into VCS 
registries.  
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Table 4: Transaction costs (in €/VER) for a non-forestry large scale project* 
(50 ktCO2e/year, verified every year during 7 years)  
CDM** GS CDM** GS VER VCS VER+ CCX***
Total certification:
validation, verification, registration 
and registry fees 0,58 0,68 0,32 0,26 0,17 0,23
Total incl. Consultancy/internal:
PDD development and management 
of certification 0,85 1,00 0,59 0,48 0,40 0,36
*located in a non-annex I country (CCX offset registration fees differ depending on where the project  is located)
**to include the 2% share of CERs issued to projects for the UN adaptat ion fund, we assume that CERs trade at  15€. This adds €15 
000/year of forgone carbon revenues to the transact ion costs of  this project.
***Given that we listed the "offset providers" as  "associate members" among CCX offset retailers, we use the average membership 
fee. This fixed transaction cost is diluted over the projects  of  the retailer. To account for this dilution, we divide it by the average 
number of  projects per retailer (4,5).  
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
For a large scale project, one can see the impact of the different provisions discussed 
earlier on the global certification costs. Again, it is more meaningful to concentrate 
on the difference between standards rather than on the absolute value of the estimate. 
Roughly compared to the other basic carbon standards, the VER+ benefits from the 
absence of registration fees as well as a fixed registry fee only consisting of an 
account opening charge of €550. Conversely, the GS CDM appears to be the most 
costly certification scheme as it accumulates the work and fees imputable to both 
CDM and GS VER. Eventually, transaction costs are shown to differ significantly 
between standards: both external and overall costs are more than halved in the cases 
of the CCX and VER+ when compared to the CDM or GS CDM. This difference 
mainly comes from the 2% levy that feeds the adaptation fund (0.3 €/VER). 
Nevertheless, the price premium that the CDM or the GS can command compared to 
the other standards (see part 2) is a lot higher than these differences. When possible, it 
is therefore more profitable for large-scale projects to seek CDM or GS certification.  
Table 5: Transaction costs (in €/VER) for a non-forestry small scale project* 
(5 ktCO2e/year, verified at years 1, 3, 5, and 7) 
CDM SSC** GS VER Micro VCS VER+ CCX***
Total certification:
validation, verifications, registration 
and registry fees 1,16 0,35 0,94 0,94 1,07
Total incl. Consultancy/internal:
PDD development and management 
of certification 3,10 2,60 2,37 2,51 1,93
*located in a non-annex I country (CCX offset registration fees differ depending on where is localised the project)
**to include the 2% share of CERs issued to projects for the UN adaptation fund, we assume that CERs trade at 15€. This adds €15 
000/year of forgone carbon revenues to the transaction costs of this project.
***As we listed as many "offset providers" as "associate members" among CCX offset retailers, we use the average 
membership fee. This fixed transaction cost is diluted over the projects of the retailer. To account for this dilution, we divide it 
by the average number of projects per retailer (4,5).
 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
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The special provisions the CDM and GS allow their respective small and micro-
scaled projects to lower considerably the external certification costs compared to their 
large-scale schemes. Conversely, the VCS, VER+ and CCX make no difference for 
the size of projects and do not show significant cost-cuts with changing project sizes. 
Nevertheless, the cost per credit remains much higher than in the large-scale case, 
except for the GS VER whose provisions for micro-scale projects maintain external 
certification costs per credit at the level of a large-scale project. When costs of PDD 
development and project management are included, the CCX, and to a lower extent 
the VCS, are the only standards to significantly decrease transaction costs. This may 
explain the smaller median size of CCX and VCS projects we previously noted. 
Table 6: Comparison of transaction costs for VER and CDM forestry projects 
(Afforestation/Reforestation) 
TRANSACTION COSTS2 CDM A/R (€) CDM A/R SSC (€) cost1 (€) ∆ (%) cost1 (€) ∆ (%) cost1 (€) ∆ (%) cost1 (€) ∆ (%) cost1 (€) ∆ (%)
Auditing (DOE) 21 000 14 000 18 000 -14 18 000 -14 28 000 33 18 000 -14 10 000 -52
Consultancy/internal 87 000 77 000 73 000 -16 83 000 -5 99 000 14 81 000 -7 22 000 -75

















X Buffer:at  least 20% N/A Buffer: 20% X
Auditing (DOE) 6 000 5 000 6 000 0 6 000 0 10 000 67 6 000 0 6 000 0
Consultancy/internal 5 000 5 000 5 000 0 5 000 0 5 000 0 5 000 0 5 000 0





































1 Calculated on the base of €1000/man-day Cost increase
2 Excluding project finding and new methodology development Cost reduction
3 See appendix for quantitative details
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sampling at verification
.Only for CCX 
members after 
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membership fees
.Non-Permanence Risk 




















EXPLANATION3 OF THE 
COST DIFFERENCE
VCS AFOLU
.Same auditor for 
validation and 1st 
verification
.Approval delivered 
directly by the auditor
.DNA's approval not 
required 












.Same auditor for 




.DNA's approval not 
required
.Project directly 
approved by the auditor
.No credit issuance
.Lower fees related to 
the standard 
administration                
.Same auditor for 
validation and 1st 
verification
.Approval delivered 
directly by the auditor
.DNA's approval not 
required
.Lower fees related to 
the standard 





incorporated in the 
project eligibility
.No distinction between 
validation and 1st 
verification
.DNA's approval not 
required
.EIA and local 
stakeholder 
consultation if 
requiered by host 
country law
.No analysis needed to 
determine the buffer 
level (fixed)                    
 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts 
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As shown in table 6, the VCS, VER+ and CCX offer forestry projects the same 
flexibility provisions as for non-forestry. These also give rise to equivalent 
transaction costs reductions along the project cycle.  
3.3.7. Ensuring co-benefits for the CCB Standards 
The CCB Standards certification has extra requirements that ensure additional 
sustainable development benefits with regards to communities and biodiversity. We 
estimate that these special provisions require about 12 extra man-days for PDD 
development, three for validation, and four, at each verification. Conversely, it has 
fewer requirements regarding carbon accounting and the risk of non-permanence than 
the other standards. Eventually, if undertaken alone, the CCB Standards reduces up-
front costs by about 15% for auditing and 5% for consultancy/internal costs compared 
to the CDM. 
However, to improve the quality of certification with regards to carbon accounting 
and the risk of non-permanence, and to allow project developers to market their 
emission reductions as “true” carbon assets, the CCB Standards administration 
encourages its users to also apply to a carbon accounting standard such as the CDM, 
VCS or VER+. Compared to the CDM alone, the combination of their respective 
requirements gives rise to an approximate 30% cost increase for up-front auditing and 
70% cost increase for periodic verifications. 
The new version of the CCB Standards23 only adds the “adaptative management and 
knowledge dissemination plan” to its basic requirements. A project developer 
estimated that this should not burden the process by more than a person-day since it is 
only about reporting and documenting on a procedure that was usually done by CCB 
Standards project developers anyway. 
A notable difference between forestry and the other types of projects stands in how 
standards deal with the risk of non-permanence. 
3.3.8. Addressing non-permanence of forestry carbon assets 
CDM A/R projects address it through the generation of two types of temporary 
credits CERs (tCERs) and long-term CERs (lCERs). These credits are both temporary 
(5 and 20-30 years respectively) and must therefore be replaced every so often. The 
project proponent must opt for one of them depending on its financial needs and on 
the stream of credits to be generated by the project.  
A second option to deal with the risk of non-permanence is to establish buffer 
reserves of non-tradable carbon credits, in order to cover up for unexpected project 
failure. For the VCS AFOLU and the VER+, the buffer level (5-60% of the credits 
generated annually) is determined from a risk analysis of the potential for future 
carbon loss. The VCS intends to keep track of every project for 70 years and use the 
“buffer credits” pooled in a common VCS reserve to replace all credits coming from 
23 CCB Standards version 2, applicable from December 2008. 
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failing projects or projects which have stopped verifying their reductions. The CCX 
establishes a fixed buffer level (20%) without preliminary risk assessment. 
Table 7 illustrates project certification costs and carbon revenues after five years of 
crediting, for a small scale A/R project generating 5ktCO2e/year of emission 
reductions. In our calculations, we use a 30% buffer under the VCS AFOLU and 
VER+, which corresponds to the medium risk class.  
In this example, the CDM SSC appears to offer the least costly certification scheme 
while a CDM seeking CCB Standards certification doubles the certification costs. A 
project developer choosing the standards subject to a buffer withholding, i.e. VCS 
AFOLU, VER+ or CCX, commits to renouncing to substantial carbon revenues in the 
early age of the project. For the VCS however, the credits initially withheld are 
distilled back to the project developer during subsequent verification, in order to give 
him an additional incentive to keep verifying the project. In our example, 5% of the 
30% initially withheld are given back to the project developer at the second 
verification (year 10). 
These buffers push transaction costs up, especially for the VCS AFOLU and the 
VER+. The Forest Carbon Project Standard of the American Carbon Registry offers, 
apart from contributing to a buffer, two other options to address the risk of non-
permanence, i.e. an insurance based solution guaranteeing for replacement price for 
offsets or a replacement by non-forest offsets that meet the Registry Standards. This 
may offer project proponents with more flexibility in their investment decisions. 
However, one must bear in mind that this comparison is somehow unfair: permanent 
VCS forestry credits will probably command a higher price on the voluntary market 
than their temporary CDM counterparts. Thus, higher transaction costs may be 
balanced by higher carbon revenues. 
Table 7: Transaction costs (in €/VER) for a small-scale AR project* 
(5 ktCO2e/year, verified every 5 year during 10 years) 
CDM SSC VCS AFOLU CCBS CCBS CDM VER+ CCX***
Total certification (3€/credit) 0,38 1,42 0,48 0,76 1,42 1,11
Total incl. Consultancy/internal (3€/credit) 2,02 2,98 2,24 2,84 3,14 1,65
Total certification (10€/credit) 0,38 2,95 0,48 0,76 2,95 2,51
Total incl. Consultancy/internal (10€/credit) 2,02 4,51 2,24 2,84 4,67 3,05
*located in a non-annex I country (CCX offset registration fees differ depending on where is localised the project)
*** As we listed as many "offset providers" as "associate members" among CCX offset retailers, we use the average membership fee. This fixed transaction cost is diluted over the projects of 
the retailer. To account for this dilution, we divide it by the average number of projects per retailer (4,5).
The forgone carbon revenue due to buffer witholding is added to transaction costs assuming a credit price (3 or 10 €/VER). The initial buffer is 30 % for the VCS and the VER+, and 20 % for 
the CCX.  
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
There is growing interest in the VCS AFOLU among project developers. However, 
some of them claim they would only use it for projects fitting in the least risky 
category so as to avoid too large buffer and renounce to a substantial part of the 
credits generated in the first crediting years. Some also think large buffers may 
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3.4. Transaction costs: do they matter? 
The transaction costs related to certification occur at each stage of the project cycle, 
from pre-implementation to the end of the crediting period. Relying on the financial 
features of a recently registered CDM24, we assess their impact on the global returns 
of the project and the origination cost of a carbon credit (1 tCO2e). 
The Internal Rate of Return25 (IRR) is a financial indicator assessing the viability of 
an investment as it defines an investment decision threshold; if the IRR of the 
investment is higher than a certain value, then the investment should be realised. As 
for the CDM, UNFCCC rules require a proponent to demonstrate that the project 
needs to generate carbon credits to reach a benchmark IRR. The latter may vary from 
country-to-county, within country, or even be specific to a company according to its 
cost of capital. 
Figure 6: IRR as a function of the carbon price: case of a CDM hydropower 




























Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
Figure 6 describes the price at which the carbon credits of this specific project must 
be valued to reach the IRR benchmark defined at 10%. Depending on the standard, 
the cost of a credit ranges from €13.35 (VER+) to €13.72 (GS CDM). 
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As shown in the table 8, in this very case, the GS CDM is the only standard to require 
a higher carbon price than the CDM in order to reach the 10% threshold 
(+€0.1/tCO2e), whereas under the CCX the project becomes worth undertaking with a 
carbon price €0.27/tCO2e below the CDM threshold. 
The IRR analysis thus leads to the same conclusion as the transaction costs per credit: 
based on the insights we have of market prices, the most profitable option for this 
project is therefore to seek CDM and GS certification if possible. 
Table 8: Carbon price needed to reach the profitability threshold: case of a 
CDM hydropower project (50 ktCO2e) 
Standard GS CDM GS VER VER+ VCS CCX
Credit price threshold difference 
relative to CDM (€/tCO2e) 0,10 -0,09 -0,21 -0,17 -0,27  
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
If we conduct the same analysis for a similar project, but lower-scaled (15 ktCO2e), 
the largest difference in carbon price threshold we find between standards is 
€0.43/tCO2e. 
From these two case studies, we can conclude there is no significant transaction costs 
difference for hydro projects from standard-to-standard, with low sensitivity to the 
scale of the project.  Due to a lack of data, we were unable to conduct a similar 
analysis for other types of projects. However, we can intuit that the difference of 
transaction costs among standards have a growing impact on the project profitability 
when they represent a higher share of total project costs. 
Ellis et al. (2007) highlight the large disparity in the level of investment from project 
type-to-type. As shown in Figure 8, they distinguish projects entirely dedicated to the 
CDM whose economic benefits are CERs only (e.g. manure management, landfill 
gas), and those using the CDM as an add-on whose income also comprises the selling 
of other outputs (e.g. elec
Figure 8: Impact of 
transaction costs o
tricity for hydro and wind power, or timber for forestry).  
n 
the IRR, a function of 
Source: adapted from 
Ellis et al. 2007. 
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If we have shown the transaction costs differences from standard to standard do not 
matter much to the IRR of hydro projects, they
luntary carbon market to recover 
3.
atures in the actual context 
their project certified and generating carbon credits can be an important element that 
oretical number of weeks necessary for a 
 may matter for the IRR of projects 
whose investment, operating, and monitoring costs are entirely dedicated to the 
carbon offsetting activity such as biogas or manure. 
In any case, it seems that setting certification requirements and rules similar to those 
of the CDM, although costly, is the price for the vo
its credibility.  
5. The certification timeline: voluntary standards demonstrate valuable 
flexibility fe
As project developers have to bear high up-front costs, the time necessary to have 
determines their choice of a given standard. 
The different standards feature specific requirements that have direct impacts on the 
certification timeline. Figure 9 shows the the
project to be validated and registered under each standard. Appendix 3 gives further 
details on these aggregated figures. Because the development of new methodologies 
remains rare in the voluntary market (see section 3.2) we did not take it into account 
in these figures.  



















CDM CDM SSC GS VER VER+ CCBS CCX VCS
Theoretical timeline
Estimated timeline
Number of weeks from 
validation to registration
 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
The validation stage is relatively similar 
they need at least 7 to 8 weeks to review the proj
among standards. In any case, auditors say 
ect documents, conduct an on-site 
review, and write the final determination report after resolution of the corrective 
actions by the project proponent. However, the CDM, VER+, and CCB Standards 
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cation turns out to require much more time in practice. 
e EB at the registration stage may be more specific to 
ted within that of CDM, although it theoretically requires as much time. 
 
                                                          
require the project documents to be displayed on the standard’s or auditor’s website at 
the early stages of validation in order to take into account public comments. This 
lengthens the validation process of respectively 4, 4, and 3 weeks. As for the GS, this 
can be done in parallel with the validation process. The most significant differences 
come from the registration step. While CCB Standards, VER+ and VCS projects are 
directly approved by the DOE, the CDM requires that a request for registration is 
made available online for 8 weeks (3 for the CDM SSC) and the GS gives its 
technical committee the same amount of time to review the project documents. In the 
end, the theoretical timeline for project certification varies from 10 weeks for the 
VCS to 28 for the GS VER. 
However, all the professionals we interviewed argued that this ideal timeline is 
seldom respected, and certifi
Based on an analysis of the UNEP Risoe CDM pipeline, Elabed et al. (2008) assesses 
that 246 days26 (about 35 weeks) are necessary for CDM project validation, and 96 
days (about 14 weeks) for the CDM EB to register a validated project. To explain 
these figures, the authors point to human resources shortages in the staff of both 
DOEs and the CDM Executive Board. To estimate the effective certification timeline 
of each standard, we assumed that the delay in each stage is proportional to that 
observed for CDM in the corresponding stage (validation or registration). The results 
are also displayed in Annex 3.  
If the DOE shortage may also affect the projects developed along voluntary 
standards, other delays due to th
the CDM. As registration takes little time in most voluntary standards, this does not 
affect much our results. The only exception is the GS VER: should the GS board be 
more diligent than the CDM EB, we would be overestimating the real GS VER 
timeline. 
According to some project developers, the GS CDM certification process can indeed 
be comple
Given this actual context, some CDM applicants may have started to generate credits 
while still awaiting UNFCCC registration. As retroactive crediting is no longer 
permitted under UNFCCC rules27, these projects may value these emissions 
reductions as “pre-CDM VERs” thanks to the voluntary standards’ retroactive 
crediting provisions. According to Table 5 all the voluntary standards allow 
retroactive crediting, back to 2 years before enrolment and up to 2003 under the CCX 
for certain types of projects. 
 
26 Average figures. 
27 A CDM project registered after 31 March 2007, can only claim credits for emission reductions that occurred after its 
UNFCCC registration  
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Table 9: Retro-active crediting provisions of the standards 
Standard CDM GS VCS VER+
2 years prior bacno longer 2 years prior 2 years prior ng 
CCX
*for Rangeland soil carbon management offsets, Agricultural soil and Forestry carbon offsets.
registration
k to 2003 for 






Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
To fully benefit from this opportunity, t
retroactive credits and CERs at the same time. This may considerably lower the 
4. C
he VCS allows DOEs to verify pre-CDM 
auditing costs for the project proponent. 
onclusions 
This study distinguishes between two types of third party standards in the voluntary 
market. The projects certified by multiple-benefit carbon standards, such as GS and 
y issue trade at lower 
 
can also come from the time required to get their project certified. Given the DOE 
shortage that carbon markets are experiencing at the moment, it seems hard to 
CCB Standards, display characteristics that differ from those of CDM projects. They 
indeed use with a more diverse set of methodologies, thus spreading the benefits of 
carbon finance over different sectors. They also appear to attract projects located in 
countries where the CDM is not very developed. The strong demand for their 
“gourmet” credits, combined with a supply shortage, has allowed them to capture and 
maintain price premiums on the market for carbon credits. 
Basic carbon standards, such as VCS, VER+, and CCX, are more similar to the CDM 
in terms of project characteristics. Although the credits the
prices, these standards have nonetheless attracted numerous projects. In particular, 
they have been used by project proponents to mitigate the delays inherent to the CDM 
registration process, since their respective portfolios have consisted so far of a 
majority of pre-CDM projects. They also include projects in niche markets like 
Turkey where projects cannot apply to the CDM. The CCX is different in that it has 
historically certified the lion’s share of domestic U.S offset projects.  
It is also important to look at the transaction costs these different standards entail. We 
find a difference of up to 100% on the transaction cost per credit between standards.
However, when these costs remain small compared to the overall costs of a project, 
we also show that the choice of the standard does not make a significant difference on 
the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). This is the case of projects using the CDM as an 
add-on to the production of other outputs (electricity for hydro or wind, wood for 
forestry). Given the price difference on the market, it seems more interesting to 
develop such projects along a multiple-benefit standard, if eligible. We however 
expect higher differences on the IRR for projects whose investment capital is entirely 
dedicated to generating carbon credits such as biogas or manure management. 
As projects developers have to bear significant upfront costs, the choice for a standard 




conclude if the shortcuts allowed by the voluntary standards offer substantial gains of 
time compared to the CDM. Again, their special provisions allowing retro-active 
crediting are however a good opportunity to mitigate the risk of delay in the 
certification of the project, and have benefited to numerous CDM projects that have 
thus valued their emission reductions while awaiting UNFCCC registration 
As the future of the CDM is currently being discussed, studying the voluntary 
standards helps identify interesting lessons on project-based emissions reductions. It 
is probably too early to evaluate some innovations of these stand
performance-based methodology has yet been approved by the VCS, let alone be 
used. The CCX has proven its ability to reduce transaction costs and to attract smaller 
projects, but the additionality of its certified emissions reductions has not been 
questioned in this study. Regarding multiple-benefit carbon standards however, this 
study shows that certifying ancillary benefits needs not necessary entails much higher 
costs. 
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Annex 1: Matrix of transaction costs for non-forestry offset projects (part 1) 
LEGEND:  C / I Consultancy/internal costs (man-day) S Standard costs (€/$) Cost increase  ↑ Same as CDMs
A Auditing costs (man-day) R Registry costs (€/$) Cost reduction ↓
 
CDM        
(benchmark)
Consultant and DOE Honorary 
(man-days)  /  Fee ($)
Differing requirements 
from CDM
Costs Differing requirements 
from CDM
Costs Differing requirements from 
CDM
Costs Differing requirements from 
CDM
Costs
 C / I Project finding and assessment Fixed for a given project
New methodology 2 accepted to date 2 accepted to date
 C / I Development Fixed for a given project
A
 C / I
 C / I
S Methodology review. To the GS  $500
Methodology review. To 
the GS  $500
A or S Expert Desk Review (2 experts) 5 1 expert 2
 C / I
Dealings with the EB approval 3
PDD development
 C / I Project description 5
 C / I
Baseline scenario:
baseline methodology, 
assumptions in calcultations, 
project specific basis, treatment of 
national or sectoral policies
10 Use of simplified baseline,  
deemed representative of 
what would occur in the 
absence of the project. No 
other requirements 
4-6
 C / I
Assessment and demonstration of 
the additionality: "the additionality 
tool" (4 step-approach)
10 No "additionality tool" but 
only the barrier analysis  
(step 3) is required
4-6 No detailed financial plan 
needed (as an ODA cannot 
be used for the purchasing 
of credits)
8 No detailed financial plan 
needed (as an ODA cannot 
be used for the purchasing 
of credits)
8
 C / I
ERs and monitoring:                     
Emissions and sources of 
potential increase, baseline, 
quality assurance and control 
procedure, ERs and periodic 
procedure
5 Use of a simplified 
monitoring methodology: 
no identification of 
potential increases of 
emissions, no quality 
assurance and control 
procedure, no procedure 
for periodic ERs 
4-6
 C EIA                          5 EIA                          5 EIA                          5
 C / I
GS Sustainable 
Development Matrix and 
Monitoring plan
5 GS Sustainable 
Development Matrix and 
Monitoring plan
5 GS Sustainable 
Development Matrix and 
Monitoring plan
5
 C / I
Local stakeholders' consultation 4-5 More structured and 
stricter rules 
8 More structured and stricter 
rules for the local 
stakeholders consultation
8 More structured and stricter 





Desk review 4 Simplified baseline, 
monitoring, additionality 
tool
2 GS Sustainable 
Development Matrix and 
Monitoring plan, 
stakeholder consultation
5 GS Sustainable 
Development Matrix and 
Monitoring plan, stakeholder 
consultation
5 GS Sustainable 




A Global Stakeholder process 1
A
On-site visit 4 Simplified baseline, 
monitoring, additionality 
tool
2 GS Sustainable 
Development Matrix and 
Monitoring plan, 
stakeholder consultation
6 GS Sustainable 
Development Matrix and 
Monitoring plan, stakeholder 
consultation
6 GS Sustainable 




A Pre-report with CARRs 2
A Final report 1
A Validation approval by the certification body
1
 C Assitance with DOE 5
No voluntary pre-
assessment by DOE 0




° Audit by DOE
° Assistance
Submission to UNFCCC (DOE)
° Assistance
° Application Fee         
CDM SSC GS CDM Large GS VER
1
$1,000                                         
No fee to the EB
Sustainable Development:             










10 No voluntary pre-assessment by DOE
0
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Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
Annex 1: Matrix of transaction costs for non-forestry offset projects (part 2) 
LEGEND:  C / I Consultancy/internal costs (man-day) S Standard costs (€/$) Cost increase  ↑ Same as CDMs
A Auditing costs (man-day) R Registry costs (€/$) Cost reduction ↓
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CDM        
(benchmark)
Consultant and DOE Honorary 
(man-days)  /  Fee ($)
Differing requirements from 
CDM
Costs Differing requirements from 
CDM
Costs Differing requirements from 
CDM




 C / I
DNA's approval 7-8 Limited to a letter of 
communication to the DNA
0 Limited to a letter of 
communication to the DNA
0
S
Registration fee Estimate of the number of credits to 
be generated the 1st year:
$0.10/CER for the first 15,000t 
$0.20/CER above 15,000t    
No fee is ERs<15kt
otherwise same as large 
scale     
$0 Credit for the anticipated 
amount of Ers certified after 
the 1st verification 
(anticipation of the 1st label 
issuance fee). To the GS.
IDEM CDM  + 
$0,05/CER
Credit for the anticipated 
amount of Ers certified after 
the 1st verification (anticipation 
of the 1st issuance fee). To the 
GS.
$0,10/VER Credit for the anticipated 
amount of Ers certified after 
the 1st verification 
(anticipation of the 1st 
issuance fee). To the GS.
$0,10/VER
 C / I
Dealings with EB 5 Dealings with EB       
Dealings with the GS 
Foundation (pre-
assessment+registration)
5                          
5+5
Dealings with the GS 
Foundation (pre-
assessment+registration)




 C / I
Knowledge capitalization and 
dissemination
Fixed for a given project
Monetization of ERs
 C / I Assistance with ERPA 5
C / I Assistance with strategy 5
First verification
A
Desk review 3 Same DOE for validation and 
verification
2 GS Sustainable Development 
Matrix and Monitoring plan
4 GS Sustainable Development 
Matrix and Monitoring plan




On-site visit 3 Same DOE for validation and 
verification
2 GS Sustainable Development 
Matrix and Monitoring plan
4 GS Sustainable Development 
Matrix and Monitoring plan
4 Same DOE for validation and 
verification
2
A Final report 1 CDM + GS reports 2
A
Verification statement by the 
certification body
1
C / I Assitance with DOE + Monitoring 5
Credits issuance
S
Issuance fee to the EB Admin Share of Proceeds:
$0.10/CER for the first 15,000t 
$0.20/CER above 15,000t
(As registration fee the 1st year)
None $0 Admin Share of Proc
GS CER label issuance (year 
2+) . To the GS.              
IDEM  CDM
+
+$0,05 / CER        
GS VER credit issuance. To 
the GS.                  
$0,10 / VER      
+                   
GS VER credit issuance. To 
the GS.                  
$0,10 / VER       
+                   
Other administrative costs
S Adaptation fund fee 2% of the CERs issued each year None $0 None $0
Registry 
R or S
Account fee None Registry use $0,05/VER Registry use $0,05/VER
R
Transaction fee None None None None None
Periodic verification  (same DOE) 
and monitoring
A Desk review 2 3 3 3
A
On-site visit 2 Less work on the field due to 
the simplified monitoring 1
3 3 3
A Final report 1 CDM + GS reports 2
A
Verification statement by the 
certification body
1
C / I Assitance with DOE + Monitoring 5
 GS Sustainable Development 
Matrix
 GS Sustainable 
Development Matrix
No issuance of CERs in the registry.            The 
GS Foundation only tracks serial numbers
Large GS VER Small GS VER
GS Sustainable Development 
Matrix
PROJECT CYCLE CDM SSC GS CDM
 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
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Annex 1: Matrix of transaction costs for non-forestry offset projects (part 3) 
LEGEND:  C / I Consultancy/internal costs (man-day) S Standard costs (€/$) Cost increase  ↑ Same as CDMs
A Auditing costs (man-day) R Registry costs (€/$) Cost reduction ↓
 
CDM        
(benchmark)
Consultant and DOE Honorary 
(man-days)  /  Fee ($)
Differing requirements 
from CDM
Costs Differing requirements 
from CDM
Costs Differing requirements 
from CDM
Costs Differing requirements 
from CDM
Costs
 C / I Project finding and assessment Fixed for a given project
New methodology 0 accepted to date 0 accepted to date
 C / I Development Fixed for a given project
A
 C / I
 C / I Auditors 0
S Methodology review. To the GS $500 No Fee €0
A or S Expert Desk Review (2 experts) 5 Assessment by auditor IIDealings with auditor II
5
10
 C / I
Dealings with the EB approval 3 Approved directly by the 2 
auditors
0
PDD development PDD = "proposal" or "questionnaire"
 C / I Project description 5
 C / I
Baseline scenario:
baseline methodology, 
assumptions in calcultations, 
project specific basis, treatment 
of national or sectoral policies
10 Baselines by project type 
already determined by the 
CCX
0
 C / I
Assessment and demonstration 
of the additionality: "the 
additionality tool" (4 step-
approach)
10 No detailed financial plan 
needed (as an ODA 
cannot be used for the 
purchasing of credits)
8 No project-specific 
assessment (incorporated 
in the project type 
eligibility)
0
 C / I
ERs and monitoring:                     
Emissions and sources of 
potential increase, baseline, 
quality assurance and control 
procedure, ERs and periodic 
procedure
5
 C / I  EIA: if required by host country laws  
0  EIA: if required by host 
country laws  
0 EIA: If requiered by 
national laws
0
 C / I
GS Sustainable 
Development Matrix and 
Monitoring plan
5
 C / I
Local stakeholders' consultation 4-5 More structured and 
stricter rules for the local 
stakeholders consultation
8 needs to be carried out. If 
justified and documented 
that project does not 






A Global Stakeholder process 1 No global consultation required 0
A
On-site visit 4
A Pre-report with CARRs 2
A Final report 1
A Validation approval by the certification body
1
 C Assitance with DOE 5 With GS TAC
No distinction between 
validation and verification: 
review by the CCX 
Committee on Offsets 
VCS
Assessment by auditor I
Dealings with auditor I
Fee to the "Validation 
Fund"











VER+Micro GS VER 
(No further information given on the new 
methodology approval process: 1 round  
approval. Main message: go for existing 
CDM methodologies)
Projects shall not cause 
substantial negative social 
and environmental 
impacts. Potential impacts 
shall be analyzed and 
documented in the PDD
5
Directly to the GS TAC
Sustainable Development:            






° Audit by DOE° Assistance
1
10
Submission to UNFCCC (DOE)
° Assistance




Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts.  
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Annex 1: Matrix of transaction costs for non-forestry offset projects (part 4) 
LEGEND:  C / I Consultancy/internal costs (man-day) S Standard costs (€/$) Cost increase  ↑ Same as CDMs
A Auditing costs (man-day) R Registry costs (€/$) Cost reduction ↓
 
CDM        
(benchmark)
Consultant and DOE Honorary 
(man-days)  /  Fee ($)
Differing requirements from 
CDM
Costs Differing requirements from 
CDM
Costs Differing requirements from 
CDM




 C / I
DNA's approval 7-8 Limited to a letter of 
communication to the DNA
0 Not required 0 Not required 0 Not required 0
S
Registration fee Estimate of the number of credits to 
be generated the 1st year:
$0.10/CER for the first 15,000t 
$0.20/CER above 15,000t    
Credit for the anticipated 
amount of ERs certified after 
the 1st verification 
(anticipation of the 1st 
issuance fee). To the GS.
$0,10/VER To the VCS Board €0,04 / VCU None $0 None $0
 C / I
Dealings with EB 5 Dealings with the GS 
Foundation (pre-
assessment+registration)
5 +5                   Project directly approved by 
the auditor
0 Project directly approved by 
the auditor
0
 C / I
Knowledge capitalization and 
dissemination
Fixed for a given project
Monetization of ERs
 C / I Assistance with ERPA 5
C / I Assistance with strategy 5
First verification "Project verification and enrollment"
A
Desk review 3 Same DOE for validation and 
verification




On-site visit 3 Same DOE for validation and 
verification
2 Same DOE for validation and 
verification
2
A Final report 1
A
Verification statement by the 
certification body
1
C / I Assitance with DOE + Monitoring 5 With GS TAC
Credits issuance
S
Issuance fee to the EB Admin Share of Proceeds:
$0.10/CER for the first 15,000t 
$0.20/CER above 15,000t
(As registration fee the 1st year)
GS VER credit issuance. To 
the GS.                  
$0,10 / VER       
+                   
To the VCS Board €0,04 / VCU None € 0 Offset registration and 









S Adaptation fund fee 2% of the CERs issued each year None $0 None € 0 None € 0 None $0
Registry 
R or S
Account fee None Registry use $0,05/VER To be set by VCS registries Anticipated to 
be €0,068/VCU








Transaction fee None None None To be set by VCS registries N/A Transaction fee variable €150
+ €0,03/t if 
>1,000t
Trading fee on the CCX 
platform 
$0,05/t
Periodic verification  (same DOE) 
and monitoring "Project verification and enrollment"
A Desk review 2
A On-site visit 2
A Final report 1
A
Verification statement by the 
certification body
1
C / I Assitance with DOE + Monitoring 5
$2500
If the project has already started to generate 
credits, validation and verification can be 
done at the same time (only 1 on-site visit for 
both)
Fee to the "Verification Fund"
Fee to the "Verification Fund"
Micro GS VER VCS VER+ CCXPROJECT CYCLE
 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts.  
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Annex 2: Matrix of transaction costs for forestry offset projects (part 1) 
LEGEND:  C / I Consultancy/internal costs (man-day) S Standard costs (€/$) Cost increase  ↑ Same as CDMs
A Auditing costs (man-day) R Registry costs (€/$) Cost reduction ↓
 
CDM AR   
(benchmark)
Consultant and DOE Honorary 
(man-days)  /  Fee ($)
Differing requirements from 
CDM
Costs
Differing requirements from CDM
Costs
Differing requirements from CDM
Costs
 C / I Project finding and assessment Fixed for a given project
New methodology
 C / I Development Fixed for a given project
A
 C / I
 C / I auditors 0
S No Fee $0
A or S Expert Desk Review (2 experts) 5
Assessment by  auditor II
Dealings with auditor II
5                       
10
 C / I Dealings with the EB approval 3 Approved directly by the 2 auditors 0
PDD development
 C / I
Project description
(incl. a description of climate, hydrology, soils, 
ecosystems,
endangered species)
7 No compulsary description of climate, 
hydrology, soils, ecosystems, 
endangered species
5  +                                       
.Biodiversity information     
.Community information   
                        
3                       
3
 C / I
Baseline scenario:
baseline methodology, assumptions in 
calcultations, project specific basis, treatment 
of national or sectoral policies
10 Use of simplified baseline,  
deemed representative of 
what would occur in the 
absence of the project. No 
other requirements 
4-6  +                                                 . 
Description of how the "without 
project" scenario would affect: local 
communities, biodiversity, water 
and soil ressources
5
 C / I
Assessment and demonstration of the 
additionality: "the additionality tool" (4 step-
approach)
10 No "additionality tool" but only 
the barrier analysis  (step 3) 
is required
4-6
 C / I
ERs and monitoring:
Emissions and sources of potential increase, 
baseline, quality assurance and control 
procedure, and periodic procedure for Ers 
calculations
5
 C / I
Sustainable Development:
.EIA: incl. impacts on biodiversity and natural 
ecosystems, and transboundary impacts
.Socio Economic impacts: incl. Transboundary 
impacts
.Remedial measures and planned monitoring 
7
7
5                                                 
.No transboudary impact assessment
.No transboudary impact assessment




3                       
 +
Adaptative management and 
knowledge dissemination plans
1
 C / I
Local stakeholders' consultation 10
 C / I
Adressing non-permanence: statement 
describing the approach (tCERs or lCERs)





Desk review 4 Simplified baseline, 
monitoring, additionality tool
2
A Global Stakeholder process 1 No global consultation required 0
A
On-site visit 4 Simplified baseline, 
monitoring, additionality tool
2 Non permance Risk Analysis and 
Buffer table to validate
5
A Pre-report with CARRs 2
A Final report 1
A Validation approval by the certification body 1
 C / I Assitance with DOE 5
VCS AFOLUCDM AR SSC
Assessment by auditor I







° Audit by DOE
° Assistance
   No specific procedure outlined by the EB   
In the interim, same as large scale                                                  
1                                                 
10
Submission to UNFCCC (DOE)
° Assistance
° Application Fee        
                                                  
1                                                 
$0
CDM or IPCC methodologies accepted.         VCS 
AFOLU methodologies likely to be accepted in the 
future.     
NA: Project design standard: no quantitative carbon 
certification                  
 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
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Annex 2: Matrix of transaction costs for forestry offset projects (part 2) 
LEGEND:  C / I Consultancy/internal costs (man-day) S Standard costs (€/$) Cost increase  ↑ Same as CDMs
A Auditing costs (man-day) R Registry costs (€/$) Cost reduction ↓
 
CDM AR   
(benchmark)
Consultant and DOE Honorary 
(man-days)  /  Fee ($)
Differing requirements from 
CDM
Costs
Differing requirements from CDM
Costs
Differing requirements from CDM
Costs
Registration
 C / I DNA's approval 7-8 Not required 0 Not required 0
S
Registration fee Estimate of the number of 
credits to be generated the 1st 
year:
$0.10/CER for the first 15,000t
$0.20/CER above 15,000t    
None $0 To the VCS Board €0,04 / VCU The CCBS is a project design 
standard
$0
 C / I
Dealings with EB 5 Project directly approved by the 
auditor
0 Project directly approved by the 
auditor
0
 C / I
Knowledge capitalization and dissemination Fixed for a given project
Monetization of ERs
 C / I Assistance with ERPA 5
 C / I Assistance with strategy 5
First verification + monitoring 5 years
A
Desk review 3 Same DOE for validation and 
verification
1 Same DOE for validation and 
verification




On-site visit 3 Same DOE for validation and 
verification
2 Same DOE for validation and 
verification
2 Same DOE for validation and 
verification
2
A Final report 1
A Verification statement by the certification body 1
 C / I Assitance with DOE + monitoring 5
Credits issuance
S
Issuance fee to the EB Admin Share of Proceeds:
$0.10/CER for the first 15,000t 
$0.20/CER above 15,000t
(As registration fee the 1st 
year)
None $0 None €0
S Non-permanence tCERs or ICERs
Other administrative costs
S
Adaptation fund fee 2% of the CERs issued each 
year None
$0
None € 0 None $0
Registry 
R or S




Transaction fee None To be set by VCS registries N/A
Periodic verification (same DOE) + 
monitoring 5 years
A Desk review 2
A
On-site visit 2 Less work on the field due to 
the simplified monitoring
1
A Final report 1
A Verification statement by the certification body 1
 C / I Assitance with DOE + monitoring 5
Project design standard: no quantitative carbon 
certification
No credit issuance




If the project has already started to generate credits, 
validation and verification can be done at the same 
time (only 1 on-site visit for both)
Buffer: 5-60% depending on the risk level
PROJECT CYCLE CDM AR SSC VCS AFOLU
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Annex 2: Matrix of transaction costs for forestry offset projects (part 3) 
LEGEND:  C / I Consultancy/internal costs (man-day) S Standard costs (€/$) Cost increase  ↑ Same as CDMs
A Auditing costs (man-day) R Registry costs (€/$) Cost reduction ↓
 
CDM AR   
(benchmark)
Consultant and DOE Honorary 
(man-days)  /  Fee ($) Differing requirements from CDM
Costs
Differing requirements from CDM
Costs
 C / I Project finding and assessment Fixed for a given project
New methodology
 C / I Development Fixed for a given project
A
 C / I
 C / I
S
A or S Expert Desk Review (2 experts) 5
 C / I Dealings with the EB approval 3
PDD development
 C / I
Project description
(incl. a description of climate, hydrology, soils, 
ecosystems,
endangered species)
7  +                                       
.Biodiversity information     
.Community information   
                        
3                       
3
 C / I
Baseline scenario:
baseline methodology, assumptions in 
calcultations, project specific basis, treatment 
of national or sectoral policies
10  +                                                 . 
Description of how the "without 
project" scenario would affect: local 




 C / I
Assessment and demonstration of the 
additionality: "the additionality tool" (4 step-
approach)
10 No project-specific assessment 
(incorporated in the project type 
eligibility)
0
 C / I
ERs and monitoring:
Emissions and sources of potential increase, 
baseline, quality assurance and control 
procedure, and periodic procedure for Ers 
calculations
5
 C / I
Sustainable Development:
.EIA: incl. impacts on biodiversity and natural 
ecosystems, and transboundary impacts
.Socio Economic impacts: incl. Transboundary 
impacts
.Remedial measures and planned monitoring 
7
7
5                                                 
 + 
 Adaptative management and 
knowledge dissemination plans
1
EIA: If requiered by national laws 0 Projects shall not cause substantial 
negative social and environmental 
impacts. Potential impacts shall be 
analyzed and documented in the PDD
 C / I
Local stakeholders' consultation 10 If requiered by national laws 0 Local stakeholder process needs to be 
carried out. If justified and documented 
that project does not impact the vicinity 
negatively, no local stakeholder process 
needs to be carried out
 C / I
Adressing non-permanence: statement 
describing the approach (tCERs or lCERs)





Desk review 4 Biodiversity and Community 
(information, baseline, adaptative 
management)
5
A Global Stakeholder process 1
A
On-site visit 4 Biodiversity and Community 
(information, baseline, adaptative 
management)
5
A Pre-report with CARRs 2
A Final report 1 CDM + CCBS report 2
A Validation approval by the certification body 1
 C / I Assitance with DOE 5
               
(CCX accepts 8 defined project types)
CDM + CCBS (V2)PROJECT CYCLE
(No further information given on the new methodology 
approval process: 1 round  approval. Main message: go 
for existing CDM methodologies)
CCX VER+
No methodologyNo methodology
No distinction between validation 
and verification: review by the 
CCX Committee on Offsets 
0
Voluntary pre-assessment
° Audit by DOE
° Assistance
                                                  
1                                                 
10
Submission to UNFCCC (DOE)
° Assistance
° Application Fee        
                                                  
1                                                 
$0
 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
Voluntary Carbon Markets: What the Standards Say… 
 
 
Annex 2: Matrix of transaction costs for forestry offset projects (part 4) 
LEGEND:  C / I Consultancy/internal costs (man-day) S Standard costs (€/$) Cost increase  ↑ Same as CDMs
A Auditing costs (man-day) R Registry costs (€/$) Cost reduction ↓
 
CDM AR   
(benchmark)
Consultant and DOE Honorary 
(man-days)  /  Fee ($) Differing requirements from CDM
Costs
Differing requirements from CDM
Costs
Registration
 C / I DNA's approval 7-8 Not required 0 Not required 0
S
Registration fee Estimate of the number of 
credits to be generated the 1st 
year:
$0.10/CER for the first 15,000t
$0.20/CER above 15,000t    
None $0 None $0
 C / I
Dealings with EB 5 Project directly approved by the auditor 0
 C / I
Knowledge capitalization and dissemination Fixed for a given project
Monetization of ERs
 C / I Assistance with ERPA 5
 C / I Assistance with strategy 5
First verification + monitoring  
A
Desk review 3 4 Same DOE for validation and verification 1
A
On-site visit 3 5 Higher level of sampling regime 6 Same DOE for validation and verification 2
A Final report 1 CDM + CCBS report 2
A Verification statement by the certification body 1
 C / I Assitance with DOE + monitoring 5
Credits issuance
S
Issuance fee to the EB Admin Share of Proceeds:
$0.10/CER for the first 15,000t 
$0.20/CER above 15,000t








S Non-permanence tCERs or ICERs
Other administrative costs
S














Registraion to Blueregistry €550/year
R
Transaction fee None Trading fee on the CCX platform $0,05/t Transaction fee variable €150
+ €0,03/t if 
>1,000t
Periodic verification (same DOE) + 
monitoring  
A Desk review 2 3
A
On-site visit 2 4 Higher level of sampling regime 6
A Final report 1 CDM + CCBS report 2
A Verification statement by the certification body 1
 C / I Assitance with DOE + monitoring 5
Biodiversity and Community 
(information, baseline, adaptative 
management)
Biodiversity and Community 
(information, baseline, adaptative 
management)
VER+
Forest Carbon Pool Reserve 20% Buffer: similar approach to VCS. At least 20% buffer
PROJECT CYCLE CDM + CCBS (V2) CCX
 
Source: Mission Climat of Caisse des Dépôts. 
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EB consideration and approval
GS approval  1 week
Submission to UNFCCC Registration to the Blueregistry
R
Approval by auditor
Final determination report Approval by auditor Final Determination Report
Final Determination Report
R
Review by CCX & project enrollment
Submission to the GS Final Verification report Registration to VCS & a VCS registry*
Final Determination Report Approval by auditor
Final Determination Report
Initial determination report Initial Determination Report
On-site visit Initial Determination Report On site interviews
On-site visit Initial Verification Report
Initial Determination Report On site interviews
On-site visit  Desk review by auditor Initial Determination Report
Desk review Preliminary approval of the CCX On site interviews
DOE to UNFCCC for PDD publication DOE-GSF for PDD publication DOE to CCBA for PDD publication Submission of the proposal to the CCX  Desk review
CDM CDM SSC GS VER VER+ CCBS V2 CCX VCS
22 weeks 18 weeks 19 weeks 13 weeks 13 weeks 11 weeks 10 weeks Theoretical timeline
49 weeks 43 weeks 40 weeks 35 weeks 37 weeks 31 weeks 26 weeks Estimated timeline
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